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 In this paper I suggest a possible explanation for the asymmetry of time. In the case that I study, the 
dynamical laws and the boundary conditions are symmetric, but the behavior of time is not. The underlying mechanism 
is statistical and closely related to the idea of multiple histories in quantum mechanics, but otherwise rather 
independent of the particular framework.  
 
 Author keywords: multiverse, time’s arrow, cosmology, entropy 
 
Je  considère une possibilité d'explication pour l'asymétrie temporelle. Dans le cas que j'étudie, la 
dynamique et les conditions aux limites sont symétriques, mais pas le comportement de la variable temporelle. Le 
mécanisme sous-jacent est statistique et est étroitement relié à l'idée d'histoires multiples en mécanique quantique, 
tout en restant assez indépendant du cadre particulier. 
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Time’s Arrow from the Multiverse Point of View 
Martin Tamm 
 
 
 
1  Introduction 
 
To explain the second law of thermodynamics and the non-symmetric behavior of time is a fundamental 
problem in contemporary physics. In any situation known to us, the direction towards the future differs from the 
direction towards the past by the property that in the former entropy increases and in the latter it decreases. The 
question is: what causes this asymmetric behavior? 
In several papers and in particular in his book [1] (see also [2], [3]), Huw Price has analyzed some of the 
possible answers that physics has come up with, and found that there is still a lot of confusion about what is actually the 
problem and what should be done to solve it: our very special human perspective on the issue of time tends to make us 
formulate the questions in the wrong way. In addition, it is not clear where to look for the solution: is it a quantum 
mechanical or an essentially classical problem? Is it a problem about the boundary conditions of the universe or is it 
something hidden within the dynamical laws? There may also be a problem with the idea of entropy itself: although we 
have a very good understanding of this concept in most situations, in cosmology it is not quite clear what it should refer 
to. 
It may very well be that the problem of time’s arrow is too complex to have a simple solution in the usual 
physical or mathematical sense of the word. But it can still be that we can clarify the problem in a convincing way by 
constructing simple models of the universe where the reason for the break of time-symmetry can be seen clearly. 
I have chosen here to work with a bounded model for space-time, even if most votes in recent years have 
supported open models. The reason is not that I want to argue in favor of a certain model for cosmology at this point. 
Rather, the motivation is that in this case the underlying global structure of space-time can be considered to be 
symmetric and finite, which makes the problem with the direction of time come out more clearly. 
Many of the ideas in this paper are related to work by other people and have appeared in other places in 
different form (see Section 2 for some background). In fact, my ambition is not so much to introduce new physical ideas 
as to launch a different way of thinking about the problem. Although a lot of effort has been made to understand the 
arrow of time starting from fundamental theories (see e.g.  www.fqxi.org for some recent developments), and also a 
lot of work has been done within statistical mechanics to understand the second law of thermodynamics, somehow 
there seems to remain a gap between these two methods of attack. 
In this paper I will have very little to say about fundamental theories. Rather, the idea is to use general 
statistical ideas to try to reach another kind of understanding. To illustrate my opinion about what should be done, the 
following analogy may be appropriate: a central place in the theory of phase transitions is held by the two-dimensional 
Ising model ([4] and [5]). This is an essentially classical and extremely simplified model of a ferromagnet. Quantum 
theory comes in only through the quantized magnetic moment, and in a way which fits well with the formalism of 
classical statistical mechanics. In spite of its classical and very simplified nature, and in spite of the fact that there are 
much more realistic models for ferromagnetism, no other model has had such an impact on our understanding of the 
nature of phase transitions. The main reason for this success seems to be that the statistical difficulties of the model 
happen to be on just the right level of difficulty; it is complicated enough to represent the essential problem, but still 
simple enough to be within reach for our methods. 
A reasonable model for time-asymmetry must by necessity be more complicated than the Ising-model, and 
this paper is only an attempt to find a kind of starting-point. In fact, what I would like to do is to construct an exact 
combinatorial model for a small multiverse which could be treated with rigorous mathematical methods. However, so 
far this task is still too difficult, hence I will in the following rather use statistical arguments. Also, clearly the analogy 
with statistical mechanics should not be pushed too far. Nevertheless, I will in this paper be concerned with a very 
simple statistical model for time-asymmetry which is essentially of classical nature. And just like in the Ising model, 
quantum mechanics enters in a simple way (in this case by assuming multiple histories). In Section 3, I will describe this 
semi-classical multiverse. 
A particular problem with this kind of multiverse is the idea of a state. Although the world is quantum 
mechanical, and although there is a sound theory for quantum mechanical states, this can be somewhat misleading in 
the multiverse context, since “parallel universes” are not to be regarded as quantum mechanical states. This is in fact 
one of the reasons why I have chosen to work with a more primitive classical kind of framework. In addition, I may add 
that it is my belief that (except for the multiverse perspective and perhaps the behavior neat the beginning and the 
end) the arrow of time can essentially be understood using classical physics. 
Although we often speak of the arrow of time, there are actually several different arrows, and one of the most 
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important questions is how these are related to each other. In Section 4, I discuss what I consider to be the most 
important ones. 
Another major problem when trying to understand the arrow of time is that it is not quite clear how to 
measure entropy in a world where the underlying geometry changes, like for instance in an expanding universe. In 
Section 5 I will therefore discuss the concept of entropy from this point of view. An additional problem is that to make 
any kind of computations with entropy in cosmology, by necessity we must make enormous simplifications, and the 
approach in this paper is no exception. 
Up to this point, my perspective is in a certain sense traditional, since a direction of time is more or less taken 
for granted. In Section 6 however, the goal is to present a model which explains time asymmetry starting from 
completely symmetric laws and boundary conditions. The underlying idea here, as well as in many other papers starting 
from Boltzmann (see [6]), is to perceive the second law as a consequence of the fact that the universe, as time evolves, 
passes from un-probable states to more probable ones. However, formulated in this way, the idea already has a definite 
idea of time direction built in to it, which tends to make it worthless in a discussion where the arrow of time is what we 
want to explain. Here, I will therefore (in the context of the dynamics of the multiverse) discuss how this idea can be 
formulated in a time-symmetric way and how the asymmetric behavior of time may arise from this starting-point. The 
idea is to show that if we randomly choose one specific development of our multiverse, then the chance for this 
development to have an asymmetric behavior of time is enormously much larger than for a symmetric behavior. The 
underlying computations are certainly based on very crude approximations and simplifications. In Section 7, I will 
therefore finally list some of the objections that can be made. 
In view of Price’s criticism, there is a strong case for using a time symmetric terminology in a discussion of this 
kind. For instance, one could use a time-axis with directions “left” and “right” instead of “backward” and “forward”. 
Nevertheless, the traditional way of thinking makes some parts easier to understand, so I have chosen not to be too 
persistent at this point. 
 
2  The historical background 
  
The cosmological perspective on the concept of entropy in a sense goes back to Boltzmann [6]. However, as a 
starting-point for the modern development we may take Gold’s article [7] from 1962 (although this paper is in fact 
based on earlier results by Wheeler and Feynman, see [8]). Here, Gold argues that the second law of thermodynamics 
might be a consequence of an expanding universe. A natural consequence of this idea is that in a contracting universe, 
entropy would decrease and we are therefore naturally lead to consider a symmetric model for the universe with low 
entropy at both ends. 
Today however, most cosmologists do not support the idea of such a symmetric behavior (see however 
Schulman [9] and also the discussion by the same author in [10]). Hence, most efforts since Gold have been 
concentrated on trying to understand why the behavior is asymmetric. There seem to have been at least three main 
strategies:   
    1.  We can try to explain the arrow of time by making appeal to some kind of asymmetric property of the 
boundary conditions of the universe.  
    2.  We can try to explain the arrow of time by making appeal to some kind of asymmetric property of the 
laws of physics themselves.  
    3.  We can assume both the boundary conditions and the laws of physics to be essentially 
time-symmetric, but consider the arrow of time to be the result of some kind of broken symmetry.  
 
The literature on this issue is very extensive. I will here only briefly recall some important ideas, partly to 
exemplify the above strategies but also because some of them are relevant for this paper. Good references for a more 
general discussion are Zeh [11] and Halliwell, Perez-Mercader, Zurek [10]. 
If we adopt the first strategy by assuming special boundary conditions, then the development of the entropy in 
between can essentially be understood starting from classical physics: if we somehow suppose that the state of the 
universe immediately after the Big Bang was exceptionally ordered, and also take for granted that the ultimate future of 
the universe (whether viewed as a Big Crunch or as an eternal expansion) will be very disordered in some sense, then 
the increase of entropy in-between appears quite natural. 
It is also possible to consider closed models with essentially symmetric boundary conditions, but where the 
asymmetry arises from some unlikely event close to one of the ends. In this case there may still exist a definite arrow of 
time in between. However, this event would have to be so improbable that it is hard to accept it as a foundation for a 
theory of time without further motivation. It is part of the philosophy of this paper to reconsider this idea from the 
multiverse point of view, 
Another way of looking at the problem has been suggested by Penrose: it could be that the growth of entropy 
is connected with the boundary conditions for the Weyl tensor [12]. This idea may be hard to confirm directly since the 
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Weyl tensor is not readily observable. But it may still be a key to understanding the arrow of time, in particular in 
combination with other ideas from quantum cosmology, 
An example of the second kind of strategy is given by the idea to connect the arrow of time with the 
time-asymmetric behavior of the K-meson. This idea appears to have been considered first by Sakharov [13] (for a 
somewhat more accessible account, see Davies [14]). 
Examples of the third kind of strategy can be found in quantum cosmology. Often, the starting point is the 
Wheeler-deWitt equation (see [15] and also [11]). Hawking, in his early attempts to understand the arrow of time in 
terms of his "no boundary condition approach", adopted Gold’s view. Later, after criticism from Page and Laflamme, he 
abandoned this idea and extended his analysis of the no boundary condition to conclude that there could be two types 
of behavior of the universe close to the end-points, one which fits nicely with a low-entropy Big Bang, and another one 
which fits with a high-entropy Big Crunch (see [16], [17]). However, the existence of these two different types of 
behavior does not in itself explain asymmetry. In fact, the main issue is to understand why the boundary behavior 
should be different at the two ends. In addition, it should be noted that parts of Hawking’s reasoning may be somewhat 
controversial, e.g. the use of imaginary time. 
There are also many other attempts to derive time-asymmetry from the Wheeler-deWitt equation within a 
more conventional framework (see Halliwell [18] and Zeh [11] for a discussion). One natural idea is to use the 
“superspace” formalism of Wheeler (see [19]) as an underlying framework for studying how different histories may 
interfere to yield asymmetry. This idea is also related to the approach in this paper. 
It may also be said that any solution to the problem of time’s arrow, based on the Wheeler-deWitt equation, 
would probably also in the end have to be an answer to the question what time itself is. A radical position has been 
taken by Rovelli ([20]) and Barbour ([21]): on the fundamental level, time may be a superfluous concept. In Barbour’s 
setting, the only things which are actually real are different configurations in a timeless “Platonia”. If we take this point 
of view, then the asymmetry of time amounts to a lack of symmetry in this timeless landscape, Again, this is a 
reasonable and interesting perspective. However, it does not in itself explain the asymmetry, so something additional 
has to be included. 
In recent years, there has been an increasing interest in explanations of time asymmetry connected with 
cosmic inflation and the idea of multiple histories (see for example [22]). Such explanations may fit very well with 
various fundamental theories. However, there still seems to remain a considerable gap to bridge before this approach 
will be able to generate a convincing answer to the fundamental questions. 
 
3  The multiverse 
  
According to the standard interpretation, both classical Newtonian mechanics and quantum mechanics are 
deterministic theories: both Newton’s equations and the Schrödinger equation can in principle be uniquely solved for all 
times once appropriate initial conditions have been specified. 
In the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics, this determinism is in a sense destroyed by 
measurements where the outcomes are generally considered to be stochastic. According to the multiverse 
interpretation of quantum mechanics, initiated by Everett [23], each outcome of a measurement of a variable 
represents a real development. And the fact that a measurement has produced a certain value just indicates that what 
the observer thinks of as his universe is nothing more than a branch of the multiverse where the result of the 
measurement is the true value of the given variable. In this way, the multiverse interpretation can be said to restore 
determinism. It should be noted however, that determinism in this setting refers to the totality of all developments, the 
multiverse, and that for an observer confined to one branch of the multiverse, the outcome of an experiment still 
appears to be at random. 
Nowadays, the idea of a multiverse has spread in different directions and acquired a number of different 
meanings (see Tegmark [24], [25]). In this paper however, I will only consider a very primitive and simplified 
multiverse. The multiverse will always be finite, not only in the sense that at each moment of time there will only be a 
finite number   of particles, but in fact the total number of possible states for all particles will be finite. Also, I will only 
consider discrete time i.e. we split the time-axis up into short intervals of equal length which we take to be our unit of 
time. 
The crucial property of the multiverse is that given a state at certain time  , there are in general several 
different developments leading to different states at time    . In theory, quantum mechanics could tell us how to 
compute the probability for different continuations. In the context of this paper however, we will usually not be able to 
consider the precise probability for each development but rather simply classify each transition from one state to 
another as "possible" or "impossible". Thus, for a given state at a given time  , there will be a certain number of states, 
at time    , which are “accessible” in the sense that a transition from the given state is possible. In this paper I will 
simplify the situation still further by assuming that the number   (the “branching rate”) of such accessible states is 
essentially independent of both the state and  . Thus, whether the universe is expanding or contracting, or whether 
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the density is high or low within reasonable limits, we still assume that the number of choices for the development is 
fixed and is equal to  . A simple way of thinking about this is to say that at each step there is always a fixed number of 
choices open to each particle. Needless to say, this approximation may be a bad one in a realistic multiverse. But it 
could still be reasonable for the purpose of this paper. 
It is important to note that we should not identify the states of the multiverse above with ordinary quantum 
mechanical states. In fact, different parallel universes should not be thought of as quantum mechanical states at all, but 
rather as a kind of “pseudo-states” which in this context represents a semi-classical approximation. Even if the 
underlying structure is quantum mechanical, the dynamics of these pseudo-states differs considerably from the 
time-development of ordinary quantum mechanical states: if different states correspond to different branches of the 
multiverse, time-development can not give isomorphisms between the sets of pseudo-states at different times, in spite 
of the fact that the underlying development of the wave-function is unitary. In fact, according to the multiverse 
perspective, it is generally assumed that all the different worlds which are parallel to ours originate from more or less 
one single state at the Big Bang. 
Within this framework an enormous amount of different developments are possible: 
 
Definition 1  A universe   is a chain of states, one state    at time   for each  , with the property that 
the transition between    and     is always possible according to the dynamical laws, where  
     .  
 
 
Definition 2  The multiverse   is the set of all possible universes   in the sense of Definition 1.  
 
Thus, we are actually studying a kind of superspace which is a huge graph where the states are nodes and 
where the edges connect states which are accessible from one another. When no ambiguity can arise, I will also 
sometimes refer to this superspace as the multiverse. It is implicit that "accessibility" is a symmetric relation, which 
physically corresponds to assuming the dynamic laws of physics to be symmetric with respect to time. 
Within this multiverse, we also suppose that we can define an entropy function which somehow measures the 
amount of order/disorder of the possible states, and that the relation between the number   of states with entropy   
and the entropy   itself is given by Boltzmann’s famous formula ([26]):  
           (1) 
 where    is Boltzmann’s constant. 
Inverting this formula, we can also write  
                                (2) 
 is a very large number (when using customary units). We conclude that at any time, the number of states   is an 
exponentially increasing function of the entropy  . Since we have assumed the number of states to be finite, it is clear 
that this can only hold for values of   which are not too large. It is thus implicit in the following that the life-span of our 
multiverse is not long enough for the entropy to come close to being maximal, except (perhaps) near the end-points 
(i.e. near the Big Bang and a possible Big Crunch). In other words, states which have a reasonable chance to occur will 
in general be comparatively ordered. In fact, rough computations indicate (see [27] and [28]) that the entropy of our 
universe today is still rather low compared to what it could be, and with the present rate of increase it will continue to 
be so for a very long time still. 
For reasons which will become clearer later, I will also assume that  
        (3) 
 where   is the branching rate introduced in the beginning of the section. In fact, a multiverse where this is not 
fulfilled is unlikely to exhibit an arrow of time, see Section 4. 
It is of course impossible to describe exactly how the entropy function   develops with time. In the following 
I will make the very simple assumption that   changes by the same amount during each unit interval of time, which 
partly can be said to amount to considering the entropy of our own universe as being a more or less linear function of 
time. Thus, after choosing appropriate units, we can say that if at a certain time   the entropy takes the value  , then 
at time     it should be    . 
It is an important point for the following to note that in a multiverse where the dynamic laws are symmetric 
with respect to time, all such claims should also be reversible. If   can grow by one unit per unit of time it can also 
decrease by one unit. So if there are   states (with entropy    ) at time     accessible from a given state at time 
 , why should there not also be equally many states at time     (with entropy    ) which are accessible from the 
given state? This should indeed be the case, although in a realistic multiverse, it may of course not hold literally for each 
individual state, but rather it would be true on an average in a statistical sense. Thus, in the simplified multiverse of this 
paper I will in the following assume that starting from a given state, there are approximately   accessible states in 
both directions of time, and whenever this simplifies the computations in a harmless way, I will actually assume that 
there are exactly   such states. This symmetry will be further discussed in Section 6. 
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As a consequence, we see that among the    states with entropy   at a given time  , only       states 
can be accessible from states with lower entropy (i.e. entropy    ) at time    , since there are only      such 
states and only   states with entropy   can be accessed from each one of them, Therefore, if we randomly pick one 
state at time   with entropy  , the chance that it should be possible to access from a state with lower entropy at time 
    is  
   
     
  
 
 
 
    (4) 
in view of (3). We conclude that for a generic state at time  , the average number of accessible states with lower 
entropy at the next moment     is    , and the average number of accessible states with higher entropy at the 
next moment     is        . Obviously, the same argument applies also to the number of accessible states 
at time    . 
 
4  The different arrows in the multiverse 
  
Before we come to time asymmetry, it may be interesting to take a closer look at the arrow of time itself. It is 
customary in discussions of this kind to talk about the arrow of time, but there are actually several different arrows. 
According to the article by Hartle and Gellmann in [10], there are at least six or seven different arrows (see also Zeh 
[11]). Here, I will mainly deal with what I consider to be the two most important ones: the thermodynamic arrow of 
time, which is the concept based on entropy and the psychological arrow of time which is based on the observation that 
what is characteristic of the past is that it is unique and that we can actually remember it. All experience that we have 
seems to support the belief that the thermodynamic and psychological arrows are in some sense equivalent. But even 
if so, the equivalence is by no means a trivial one. And, especially in situations where we can not make use of our usual 
intuition, one should be very careful when identifying them. 
It may here also be appropriate to mention a third arrow, namely the cosmological arrow which by definition 
points in the direction in which our universe expands. Thus, Gold’s original suggestion that the entropy grows in the 
direction in which space expands, may be rephrased as an attempt to identify the cosmological arrow with the 
thermodynamic one. 
To start with the thermodynamic arrow, the following formulation seems rather uncontroversial: 
 
   Time's Arrow 1 (The increase of entropy) Whenever one macroscopic state Ξ  succeeds another one Ξ with 
respect to the development of time, the entropy of Ξ  is larger than the entropy of Ξ.  
 
Suppose now that the multiverse starts from a low-entropy state (   ) at the Big Bang. According to our 
assumptions about the dynamics of the multiverse in Section 3, we see that after one unit of time, we have   possible 
developments corresponding to the possible accessible states. After two units of time we have    possible 
developments, and after   units of time we will have    possible developments. How many of these have a 
monotonically increasing entropy? Again counting in the same way we see that we now at each step have on an 
average     alternatives to choose between, so the number of strictly monotonic developments after   units of 
time will be        and hence the number of non-monotonic developments will be          . Thus we get 
(using (4)):  
 
                
            
 
         
      
 (  
 
   
)
 
   (  
 
 
)
 
    (5) 
 If   is small compared to  , we get approximately (by Taylor expansion):  
 
               
           
 
 
 
  (6) 
 Thus, if the life-span of our multiverse is small compared to  , a monotonic behavior of the entropy is much more 
common than a non-monotonic one. Without going into too many computational aspects of this theory, let me mention 
that for the kind of model I have in mind in Section 6, the constant   will indeed be very large, so the requirement 
that     should be small allows for a very long life-span of the multiverse. 
The idea of the psychological arrow of time in the multiverse context can be formulated as follows:  
 
Time's Arrow 2 (The uniqueness of the past and non-uniqueness of the future.) Every state that we 
have ever observed seems to have a unique past but a non-unique future.  
 
We have in general a very good view of the historical development that has led us to the state that we observe 
now, but it is much harder to be sure about the consequences that the present state will lead to in the future. Stated 
somewhat differently, the past is the direction in which the development is uniquely traceable and there seems to be a 
unique chain of macroscopic states connecting our present reality back to the very early history of our universe. As for 
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the future on the other hand, in any physical situation there seem to be phenomena which are genuinely unpredictable 
like, for instance, radioactive decay. According to the multiverse point of view, every such event represents a fork in the 
road towards the future. 
So why should the history be unique but not the future? If we as in (3) assume that    , then at a given 
time   (i.e.   units of time after the Big Bang), the set of states resulting from monotonically increasing developments 
(i.e. with entropy    , according to the choice of units in Section 3) will be enormously much larger than the set of 
parallel universes up to time  , since the former number is    and the latter is given by   . Consequently, if we 
assume that we can argue probabilistically, the chance that for a randomly chosen state there will be a development 
leading back to the original state at the Big Bang is very small. And the chance that there will be two or more such 
developments is even much smaller. Thus, an observer in almost any of the possible universes will see only one 
possible history. In other words, he will observe a psychological arrow in the sense of the above definition. 
In this sense, both arrows can be said to be probabilistic consequences of the dynamics in the simple 
multiverse of Section 3. It is interesting however, to observe that this does not mean that they are entirely equivalent. 
Even if they both appear and point in the same direction under reasonable assumptions, the circumstances under which 
they cease to exist differ considerably: The thermodynamic arrow appears to be an essentially classical concept, and it 
will persist as long as formula (1) is applicable, i.e. as long as the universe is still sufficiently ordered (at least if the 
life-span of the multiverse is not too long). 
The psychological arrow on the other hand is inherently quantum mechanical. It will cease to exist when the 
number of possible developments up to a certain time   will approach the total number of states at that time. When 
this happens will depend on the size of   (which is related to Planck’s constant  ) and has little to do with the entropy. 
In this paper, I will not say much more about the relationship between the arrows. I will simply assume it to be 
a fact that, in a simple multiverse of the kind discussed in Section 6, every development is unique in the direction of 
decreasing entropy but highly non-unique in the direction of increasing entropy. 
 
5  What is entropy? 
 
There are many different aspects of the concept of entropy and there are also many different definitions of 
entropy which do not appear to be fully compatible (see [29]). Nevertheless, for the purpose of this paper, I shall take 
the point of view that as long as we study stationary (or quasi-stationary) problems in bounded regions of fixed volume, 
entropy is an essentially well understood concept. Also, clearly there may be problems with the concept of entropy 
connected with black holes, dark energy and similar phenomena, but these will be left out of the discussion in this 
paper. However, there is one problem which we can not avoid when discussing time’s arrow, and where our theoretical 
understanding is much more uncertain and empirical evidence is lacking. This is the question raised by Gold [7]: Does 
the expansion of the multiverse in itself contribute to the growth of entropy? Partly, this is of course a question about 
definitions. In particular, we have to be able to tell how many states there are and how to count them. 
According to the philosophy of this paper (see Section 1), I will adopt an essentially classical perspective on 
this question. In fact, at this point I would find it quite satisfactory if I could construct a theory for a multiverse similar 
to some kind of lattice gas (see e.g. [30]). On the other hand, there seems to be no particular reason for not as well 
considering the somewhat more realistic case of an ordinary space-time split up into microscopic elementary cells with 
approximately equal volume, where we consider the state of the multiverse to be determined by specifying which cells 
are occupied by which particles. Or for that part, to consider the same kind of splitting in a classical phase-space with 
suitable restrictions on the total energy. 
Clearly, the number of states of a single particle in such a multiverse will be proportional to the volume of 
space at the given time, and the number of possible states of   particles will be approximately proportional to       
where      is the volume of space at time  . (if we assume the number of possible one-particle states to be large 
compared  ). Thus, near the Big Bang or the Big Crunch, the number of possible parallel worlds may be comparatively 
small, but in between it can grow to something enormously large. 
If we consider the simplest case where all the particles are independent, then taking logarithms and using (1), 
we see that the entropy as a function of the total volume of space at a time   can be expressed as  
               (7) 
 In fact, this is exactly the formula for the entropy of a classical ideal gas (see [4]) when temperature is kept constant. 
In classical physics, this formula can be interpreted as saying that by expanding, the gas looses a part of its ability to do 
useful work on the exterior (hence entropy grows). In the cosmological context however, such an interpretation 
becomes meaningless: the expansion and contraction of space is simply an outer requirement which the gas must 
adapt to. Nevertheless, formula (7) makes perfectly good sense, and moreover, Gold’s view also makes good sense: If 
we imagine a multiverse consisting of such an ideal classical gas (which is in a state of maximal entropy) shortly after 
the Big Bang, then we see that if first space expands, the entropy will grow. And if afterwards space contracts down to 
its previous size, the entropy will decrease to its original value. 
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On the other hand, this behavior seems to have very little to do with the second law of thermodynamics as a 
manifestation of growing disorder: the gas is all the time in a state of maximal entropy and after having first expanded 
from a given size and then again contracted down to the original size, the gas is simply back in the same macroscopic 
state. 
In this cosmological example, we are faced with a choice: in a dynamical space-time, we must either give up 
the classical definition of entropy (based on formula (1)), or we must give up our interpretation of the second law as a 
manifestation of growing disorder. My conclusion is that it is preferable to modify formula (1). However, such a 
modification is a non-trivial and perhaps painful step. Therefore, I suggest the following two conditions which such a 
modification should satisfy:   
    • Our definition of dynamic entropy in a dynamical space-time must coincide with our usual definition in 
the case of a stationary bounded region of fixed volume.  
    • Our definition of dynamic entropy should be scale-invariant in the sense that if all distances in space are 
scaled by the same factor, the entropy remains unchanged.  
 
Thus for instance, in the example with the ideal gas above, the dynamic entropy should be constant 
throughout the whole process of expanding and contracting. However, an attempt to introduce such a modified entropy 
in more general situations raises many question which are not easy to answer. One possible way to try to understand 
the behavior of entropy, could be to split the entropy up into two parts:  
                             (8) 
 where            is so to speak the trivial part caused by the expansion of the universe, and          is the part 
which is actually connected with the growth of disorder. It is not obvious that this splitting makes good sense in a 
realistic multiverse, since the expansion of space is coupled to various other processes involving entropy. But it does 
seem reasonable for instance in a multiverse where the interactions are rather weak. I will in the following use formula 
(8), with                    as in the case of an ideal gas, as a coarse approximation to the truth. 
Summing up, when we speak of the second law of thermodynamics in this paper, this will refer to the following 
statement:  
Principle 1 The dynamic entropy of our universe is non-decreasing.  
 
If we now in formula (8) divide by    and exponentiate, and then combine with (2) and (7) above, we get the 
following formula for the number of states with entropy  :  
             (9) 
 where   now refers to the dynamic entropy. From now on, I will simply drop the word “dynamic” and just speak of 
entropy when no confusion is possible.  
Remark 1 It should be noted that our universe is quite far from being an ideal gas, and the expansion of the 
universe does not take place at constant temperature. Nevertheless, for the purpose of this paper, I shall consider 
formula (9) to be good enough as an estimate of the number of possible “states of parallel worlds” with entropy   at 
time  .  
 
 
6  The asymmetry of time 
 
In this section we will consider the main issue of this paper: Why is time asymmetric? The answer that I 
propose is that if we consider the multiverse to be a huge probability space and apply certain physical assumptions to 
assign to each universe a probability weight, then it may turn out that developments with low entropy at one end and 
high entropy at the other are by far the most probable ones. The underlying laws of physics are completely symmetric 
and so is the result: the probability for low entropy close to one endpoint and high entropy close the other equals the 
probability for the reversed behavior. However, for an observer confined to a specific universe, the arrow of time will 
appear to have a definite direction. 
Rephrasing this idea in still another way, we may say that (according to this model), among all observers in 
universes parallel to ours,     will perceive our Big Bang as the Big Crunch, and     will perceive it the same way 
as we do. 
For definiteness and simplicity, I will consider a closed Friedmann space-time ([31], [32] and [11]). In this 
setting, let          be the time-interval from the Big Bang to the Big Crunch. It will be convenient to split the life-span 
of the multiverse into three different phases: Thus, we choose symmetric moments of time     and    close to the 
end-points of the interval          so that we can write  
                                      (10) 
 Coarsely speaking, this may be thought of as a kind of idealized division into “the extreme initial phase”, “the normal 
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phase” and “the extreme final phase” of the multiverse. I have no definite opinion about what the length of the extreme 
phases should be, but it seems reasonable to assume them to be very short (much shorter than a second). I will also 
assume that at times     and   , every universe will be in a unique state with entropy zero. 
During the normal phase, usual physics more or less as we know it applies. But during the extreme phases the 
world that we are trying to model may be very different from what we are used to and the arrow of time may not have 
any meaning. Clearly, the transition from one phase to another should in a more realistic model be treated as gradual. 
However, to illustrate the general mechanisms of this paper, this approximation seems appropriate. 
The following is an extension of Boltzmann’s idea ([6]) about the second law as a manifestation of the fact 
that the universe passes (as time evolves) from less probable states to more probable ones. The formulation below is 
essentially a summation of the discussion at the end of Section 3, and the reader may note that is manifestly time 
symmetric:  
Statistical Assumption 1  Given any state of a universe during the normal phase (with entropy far from 
being maximal), the number   of accessible states with higher entropy (in both directions of time) is enormously 
large, and the number of accessible states with lower entropy (in both directions of time) is very small (or rather, the 
probability   for finding any such accessible state is very small). As before, we will consider   and   to be essentially 
independent of time and of the particular state.  
 
 
Remark 2 It should perhaps be emphasized that the assumption about complete symmetry between 
developments in both directions of time at each specific moment of time is not very realistic in a universe like ours. In 
fact, many processes (like for instance the emission of light from a source) tend to so to speak preserve a memory of 
the direction of time for a long time. 
It could be that the assumption is rather reasonable in, say, a gas where the average time between 
interactions of a particle is short compared to the unit of time. Such a gas however, is of course quite far from being a 
good model for our universe. 
My conclusion is that if we could explain the asymmetry of time in such a gas, it would still be a big step 
forward. Alternatively, we may choose to perceive the above assumption as only being true in a very general average 
sense.  
 
To make things as simple as possible, let us not consider the full multiverse, but rather concentrate on the 
subset consisting of universes where the arrow of time switches direction only once. Of course, it is quite possible to 
imagine a universe where the direction of the arrow switches several times or where there is no arrow at all (the 
entropy may for instance be constant). Nevertheless, according to the discussion in Section 4, in the framework I have 
chosen, a monotonic behavior of the arrow is much more likely than a non-monotonic one, so for the purpose of 
contrasting a symmetric behavior (Gold’s view) with a non-symmetric one, the present setup in view of its simplicity 
seems adequate. 
Summing up, we will below only consider universes of the following kind: At time     the entropy is zero 
(complete order). During the first extreme phase, the entropy will grow from zero to some value  . After this, during 
the normal phase from     to   , the entropy will first grow from this value   up to a maximal value    at some 
time   , and then it will decrease down to some other value   at   , after which it then finally shrinks down to zero 
again during the final extreme phase. It is important to note that    may very well coincide with     or   ; this is 
actually as we shall see the most probable case. We also note that (according to the very simple dynamical assumptions 
about the entropy in Section 3, stating that it can only grow or decrease with one unit per unit of time) given   and  , 
the point    is completely determined by the formula  
    
   
 
  (11) 
since the graph of the entropy function consists of two linear segments with slope plus and minus one. A short 
computation shows that the maximal value of the entropy will be given by  
             
   
 
  (12) 
 
To each universe we can now assign a certain probability weight   which factors into three parts:  
            (13) 
 Here     and    represent the weights for the development from     to     and from    to    respectively, 
whereas    refers to the normal phase in between. 
During the extreme phases, the multiverse is extremely small and quantum effects dominate. Starting from 
the completely ordered states at     and   , almost anything can happen with positive probability. On the other 
hand, the extreme phases have a very short duration, so we will assume that the most probable development is that 
very little happens at all, i.e. the universe enters the normal phase in a very ordered state. In any case, whatever 
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happens is a very complicated process which depends on an very large number of more or less independent 
phenomena. Needless to say, there are many developments from     to    . But since the entropy is really the only 
variable which interests us, I will simplify the situation somewhat by just considering one state at     for each 
(integer-)value of the entropy (and similarly at   ). This is of course a simplification, but as long as the number of 
developments during the extreme phases is small compared to corresponding number of developments during the 
normal phase, it appears to be a rather harmless one. From a statistical point of view, it is now very natural to assume 
that the probabilities for the possible values   and   of the entropy at times     and    are given by a Poisson 
distribution:  
     
  
  
            
  
  
  (14) 
 where   is some positive number. If we assume      to be moderate in size, only rather small values of   and   
will give probability weights which are not extremely small. On the other hand, it is important to observe that also large 
values of   and   have a non-zero weight. As has previously been said in Section 3, we will during the normal phase 
only distinguish between possible and impossible developments. In this context this amounts to only considering the 
possible values   and   for   . 
With this set-up, we can now define a two-variable function        which is the sum over all probabilities of 
universes where the entropy takes the values   and   at times     and    respectively. According to (13) and (14), 
we have  
              
  
  
  
  
  (15) 
 where        denotes the number of possible universes with entropy   at time     and entropy   at time   . 
       thus gives the (un-normalized) probability for a randomly chosen universe to have entropy   at time     and 
  at time   . 
The proposed explanation of time-asymmetry is now contained in the following:  
Claim 1  Under appropriate circumstances (i.e. appropriate choices of the parameters in the model),        
takes very sharp global maxima when     and       (corresponding to a monotonically increasing entropy), and 
when       and     (corresponding to a monotonically decreasing entropy).  
 
The first observation to this end is that a global maximum of        must be attained when     or    . 
This is simply because            is a decreasing function of   (this follows from (16) below, since       
according to (9) increases with   ), and the factors       
     and            in (14) will also be decreasing 
functions except for very small   and  . Since the function        will (due to the assumption that the entropy can 
only grow by one unit per each unit of time) only be non-zero when          , it follows that the maximum of 
      ) can be attained only inside the square                  . 
To compute       , we will again make use of a very general statistical idea: It is easy to compute the 
number of possible developments from time     up to the point    where the entropy is maximal. Using the 
multiplicative counting as in the discussion leading to (5) we get        such developments. Similarly, we may 
compute the number of backwards development from    back to   , giving  
     . So the question is really how 
many of the forward developments from     which fit onto backward developments from   . To estimate this we will 
simply assume that the chances for a state to be accessible by developments from     and    respectively, can be 
treated as statistically independent variables. 
 
Claim 2  Suppose that   is such that the chance for two different developments starting from some states 
at time     to meet before time    is negligible small. Then the number        of universes such that   is maximal 
at             is proportional to  
 
 
     
  (16) 
 where       is the number of states of the global geometry at time    with entropy   .  
 
In fact, the number of such universes is given by the total number        of developments with 
monotonically growing entropy from     up to   , multiplied by the probability that such a development will fit onto a 
development with monotonically decreasing entropy from    to   . From our heuristic assumption about statistical 
independence, we see that the latter is given by the number        of such possible developments divided by      . 
Thus  
               
        
     
 
    
     
 
 
     
  (17) 
 According to formula (9) the total number of states       can be expressed as  
              
      (18) 
 where       is the volume of space at time   , which again is proportional to      
  where      in a closed 
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Friedmann space-time is given by a cycloidal function      on          (see [32]). Summing up, we arrive at (up to a 
multiplicative constant) the following expression for        (using (11), (12), (15) and (16)):  
          
   
 
               
    
    
  (19) 
 Although the cycloid function      is not readily expressible by elementary functions, it is now possible to analyze the 
function       . It may in fact be somewhat more natural to investigate the logarithm                 :  
                
   
 
  
   
 
                             (20) 
 where I have also used Stirling’s formula                . 
It is not true that the function        (or equivalently       ) will achieve its maximum at the points 
indicated in Claim 1 for all possible values of  ,   ,   and  . What is true however, is that this is what happens for 
the first term         
   
 
  in (20), since the function          obviously takes its maximum when      , and 
with   
   
 
 this corresponds to the two points         and         in the square  . If the other terms in (20) are 
sufficiently large, this need not be true for       , but if on the other hand they are sufficiently small it will be. Coarsely 
speaking, if       there will indeed be an asymmetric behavior, where   is the total life-span of the multiverse 
(compare the Mathematica plot to the right in figure 1), but if on the other hand       the result will instead be 
a Gold’s type of multiverse with low entropy at both ends (to the left in figure 1).  
 
Figure 1 These plots show        as a function of the entropies at times      and   .  Thus the value at       
gives  the (logarithm of) the probability  for a universe with low entropy at both ends, whereas  the value at e.g.  
         gives  the probability for low entropy at one end and high entropy at the other. In the plot to the left we have 
a Gold’s type of situation where the final terms in        dominate. To the right we have the situation where the first 
term dominates and the probability is largest at         and        . Thus in this case, the behavior of time is 
asymmetric. 
 
 
Remark 3  It is clear that the very coarse model in this Section should not seriously be interpreted in a 
quantitative way. Still it may be interesting to ask what kind of function        would give reasonable estimates of  , 
  and  ? 
First, let us simply put        which correspond to a standard estimate of the number of baryons in the 
observable universe.   and   are related as in (2), and if we make use of the fairly recent estimates of the total 
entropy of our universe in [28], it appears that if we just consider ordinary matter mainly concentrated in stars and the 
corresponding stelar entropy then it is possible that        could exhibit the right kind of behavior, but it is not clear to 
me how to evaluate various uncertain factors. If we however take into account the total entropy according to the 
quoted paper, then we get an entropy which is larger by a factor     , which apparently makes the second term in (20) 
dominate over the first. Again, it is not clear to me what conclusion should be drawn even if we disregard all the 
numerous defects of the model: this entropy mainly steams from super-massive black holes and also from radiation, 
both of which are not included here.  
 
 
 
 
7  Discussion and comments 
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Let me finally list some of the (very many) objections which can be made to this model   
    • Simplifications are abundant. To mention a few: The constancy of   and  , the abrupt change of the 
direction of times arrow at   , the assumptions about the extremely simplified behavior of the entropy, the sharp 
division into phases with different dynamic behavior (extreme phases and the normal phase), the exclusion of major 
sources of entropy etc. 
 
    • The model is based on macroscopic assumptions that may simply be wrong. We do not know that we 
live in a closed Friedmann space-time, and indeed many cosmologists prefer open models, to a large extent due to the 
discovery of the presently accelerating expansion of our universe. Also, the dynamic entropy of Section 5 may be 
controversial, and besides most cosmologists believe that the dominating part of the entropy is connected with 
phenomena which I have completely neglected in this paper, like black holes, radiation, dark energy etc. 
 
    • The treatment can not be said to be quantum mechanical.  
 
Needless to say, it would be desirable to improve on all these defects, and I will welcome every attempt to do 
so. On the other hand, it is not clear how far it is possible to extend this kind of attack, due to the enormous complexity 
of the multiverse. A possible alternative approach to the kind of explanation of time’s arrow which I have suggested in 
this paper would be to use computational combinatorics and graph theory to study small multiverses governed by the 
kind of semi-classical dynamics discussed in Section 3. This certainly leads to difficult but perhaps not impossible 
problems. 
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